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Abstract
Tackling binary analysis problems has traditionally implied
manually defining rules and heuristics. As an alternative, we
are suggesting using machine learning models for learning
distributed representations of binaries that can be applicable
for a number of downstream tasks. We construct a compu-
tational graph from the binary executable and use it with a
graph convolutional neural network to learn a high dimen-
sional representation of the program. We show the versatility
of this approach by using our representations to solve two se-
mantically different binary analysis tasks – algorithm classifi-
cation and vulnerability discovery. We compare the proposed
approach to our own strong baseline as well as published re-
sults, and demonstrate improvement on state of the art meth-
ods for both tasks.
Introduction
In recent years we have seen a big surge in applications of
machine learning to the field of security, where researchers
routinely turn to ML algorithms for smarter automated solu-
tions. For example, due to rapidly evolving modifications of
malware, ML algorithms are frequently applied to malware
detection problems. Similarly, ML algorithms allow detect-
ing and reacting to network attacks faster.
For many of the security problems, researchers are deal-
ing directly with binary executable files. Two of the main re-
lated challenges are the size of binary programs and the ab-
sence of high-level semantic structure in binary (executable)
code: the compilation process of going from source code to
binary executable programs preserves only basic low-level
instructions and data representations understood by the tar-
get CPU. When dealing with a compiled executable, a se-
curity engineer is often looking at a file containing up to
megabytes of binary code. A precise analysis of such files
with existing tools requires large amounts of computational
power, and it is particularly difficult or even impossible to
do manually. Instead, state-of-the-art tools often rely on a
combination of formal models and heuristics to reason about
binary programs. Replacing these heuristics with more ad-
vanced statistical learning models has a high potential for
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improving performance while keeping the analysis fast.
Using machine learning requires obtaining a vectorized
representation of the data. In the field of security, this prob-
lem is usually solved by hand-selecting useful features and
feeding those into an ML algorithm for a prediction. Ap-
proaches range from defining code complexity metrics and
legacy metrics (Theisen et al. 2015), to using a sequence
of system calls (Grieco et al. 2016) and many more. Be-
sides being non-trivial and laborious, hand-selecting fea-
tures raises other issues as well. First, for every task, re-
searchers come up with a new set of features. For example,
what indicates memory safety violations is unlikely to also
signal race conditions. Additionally, some features get out-
dated and will need to be replaced with future versions of
the programming language, compiler, operating system or
computer architecture.
The state-of-the-art in machine learning, however, no
longer relies on hand-designed features. Instead, researchers
use learned features, or what is called distributed represen-
tations. These are high-dimensional vectors, modeling some
of the desired properties of the data. Word2vec, for exam-
ple, is representing words in a high-dimensional space, such
that similar words are clustered together. This property of
word2vec has made it a long-time go-to model for embed-
dings in a number of natural language processing tasks. We
can take another example from computer vision, where it
was discovered that outputs of particular layers of VGG net-
work are useful for a range of new computer vision tasks.
We see an important argument for learning distributed
representations - a good representation can be used for new
tasks without significant modifications. Unfortunately, some
types of data are more challenging to obtain such a represen-
tation for, than others. For instance, finding methods for rep-
resenting longer sentences or paragraphs is an ongoing effort
in natural language processing. Representing graphs and in-
corporating structure and topology into distributed represen-
tations is not fully solved either. Binary executable programs
are a “hard” case for representing as they have traits of both
longer texts and structured, graph-like data, with important
properties of binaries best represented as control or data flow
graphs.
Distributed representations for compiled C/C++ pro-
grams – the kind that engineers in the security field
deal with the most – have not received much atten-
tion, and with this work, we hope to start filling that
gap. We propose a graph-based representation for bina-
ries, that when used with a Graph Convolutional Net-
work(GCN) (Kipf and Welling 2017), captures the seman-
tics of the program.
Our main contributions are: (i) To the best of our knowl-
edge we are the first to suggest distributed representation
learning model for binary executable programs that can be
fine-tuned to different downstream tasks; (ii) For that end,
we present a deep learning model for modelling binary exe-
cutable programs structure, computations, and learning their
representations; (iii) To prove the concept that distributed
representations for binary executable programs can be ap-
plied to downstream programs analysis tasks, we evaluate
our approach on two distinct problems - algorithm classifi-
cation and vulnerability discovery, and show improvement
on state of the art on both.
Related Work
Machine learning has a proven reputation for boosting per-
formance compared to heuristics and there has been a lot of
interest in applications of machine learning to security tasks.
We briefly discuss previous work in program binary analysis
that relies on machine learning. We structure the literature
based on the types of features extracted and by the type of
the embedding model applied.
Hand Designed Features
Designing and extracting features can be considered equiva-
lent to manually crafting representations of binaries. We can
classify such approaches based on which form of the com-
piled binary program was used to extract the features.
Code-based features The simplest approach to represent-
ing a binary is extracting some numerical or textual features
directly from the assembly code. This can be done by using
n-grams of tokens, assembly instructions, lines of code, etc.
N-grams are widely used in literature for malware discov-
ery and analysis (Li et al. 2019a; Lee et al. 2018), as well
as vulnerability discovery (Pang, Xue, and Namin 2015;
Murtaza et al. 2016). Additionally, there have been ef-
forts focusing on extracting relevant API calls or using
traces of system calls to detect malware (Wu et al. 2016;
Kolosnjaji et al. 2016).
Graph-based features Many solutions rely on extracting
numerical features of Abstract Syntax Trees(ASTs), Control
Flow Graphs(CFGs) and/or Data Flow Graphs(DFGs). We
combine these under models with graph-based features. dis-
covRE (Eschweiler, Yakdan, and Gerhards-Padilla 2016),
among other things, uses closeness of control flow
graphs to compute similarity between functions. Ge-
nius (Feng et al. 2016) converts CFG into numeric feature
vectors to perform cross-architecture bug search. Yet other
works have used quantitative data flow graph metrics to
discover malware(Wu¨chner, Ochoa, and Pretschner 2015).
Learned Features
Besides manually crafting the representations it is also pos-
sible to employ neuralmodels for that purpose. Among other
things this allows expressing and capturing more compli-
cated relations of characteristics of code. Here we can clas-
sify the approaches based on whether they use sequential
neural networks or graph neural networks.
Sequence embeddings The body of work on the natu-
ralness of software (Hindle et al. 2016; Ray et al. 2016) has
inspired researchers to try applying NLP models for se-
curity applications in general, and binary analysis in par-
ticular. Researchers have suggested serializing ASTs into
text and using them with LSTMs for vulnerability discov-
ery (Lin et al. 2017). Some of previous vulnerability de-
tection efforts also use RNNs on lines of assembly code
(Li et al. 2018). More recently, INNEREYE used neural
machine translation for binary code similarity detection
(Zuo et al. 2019).
Graph embeddings Graph embedding neural models
are a popular choice for tackling binary code-related
tasks because the construction of Control Flow or
Data Flow Graphs is frequently an intuitive and well-
understood first step in binary code analysis. For in-
stance, graph embedding models have successfully been
used on top of Control Flow Graphs for tackling the task
of code clone detection (Xu et al. 2017; Li et al. 2019b;
Ding, Fung, and Charland 2019). Researchers have also
used Conditional Random Fields on an enhanced Control
Flow Graph for attempting to recover the debug information
of the binary program (He et al. 2018).
Task Description
We evaluate the performance of our proposed representa-
tions on two independent tasks. In the first, we test the pro-
posed representations for algorithm recognition. In our sec-
ond task, we want to demonstrate the performance of learned
representations on a common security problem – discovery
of vulnerable compiled C/C++ files. The two tasks are se-
mantically different and we demonstrate in the later sections
that both can be successfully tackled with representations
constructed and learned in the same way.
Task 1: Algorithm Classification
Algorithm classification is crucial for semantic analysis of
code. It can be used for creating assisting tools for security
researchers to understand and analyse binary programs, or
discover inefficient or buggy algorithms, etc.
In this task, we are looking at real-world programs sub-
mitted by students to solve programming competition prob-
lems. We chose such a dataset because the programs in
it, being written by different students, naturally encompass
more implementation variability than it would be possible to
get by using, for instance, standard library implementations.
Our goal is to classify solutions by the problem prompts that
the solution was written for.
Written independently by different students, programs
solving the same problem have differences in implementa-
tion, in data structures used, and in ways the code was split
into functions. In some rare cases, the same problem can be
solved by more than one algorithm.
In this task, we test the ability of the model to capture
the higher-level semantic similarity, and to take into account
program behavior, functionality and complexity, while ig-
noring syntactic differences wherever possible.
Task 2: Vulnerability Discovery
Software contains bugs, which in the worst case can lead
to weaknesses that leave the system open to attacks. Such
security bugs, or vulnerabilities, are classified in a formal
list of software weaknesses - Common Weakness Enumera-
tion(CWE). Vulnerability discovery is the process of finding
parts of vulnerable code that may allow attackers to perform
unauthorized actions. It is an important problem for com-
puter security. The typical target of vulnerability discovery
is programming mistakes accidentally introduced in benign
commodity programs by their authors. It should be empha-
sised that vulnerability discovery is unrelated to malware
analysis, which is the study of programs specifically crafted
to behave in a malicious way. Our work excludes malware,
and focuses on benign programs.
Vulnerabilities may span very small or very large chunks
of code and involve a range of different programmatic con-
structs. This raises the question - at what level of granularity
in the program should we inspect them for vulnerabilities
or report to security researchers. In this work, we are con-
cerned with the question of learning representations for the
entire binary program that will help discovering vulnerabil-
ities statically, while leaving the questions of handling large
volumes of source code and working on variable levels of
granularity for future work. Our work builds on standard
binary-level techniques for control-flow recovery (i.e., the
reconstruction of a CFG), which is a well-studied problem
where state-of-the-arts models perform well with high accu-
racy and scalability (Andriesse et al. 2016).
Model
We start by converting the binary executable to a program
graph that is designed to allow mathematically capturing the
semantics of the computations in the program. Next, we use
a graph convolutional neural network to learn a distributed
representation of the graph. Below we describe the process
of constructing the program graph, followed by a brief intro-
duction to how graph convolutional neural networks work.
We also describe the baseline model that we use for evalua-
tion and comparison.
Program Graphs
We start by disassembling the binary program and construct-
ing a control flow graph(CFG). A CFG is a representation
of the program, where each node is a linear sequence of
commands (representing a so-called basic block). A basic
block does not contain any control-flow instructions, jumps
or jump targets within it. Jump targets appear only at the be-
ginning of the block and jumps - at the end. We use static
inter-procedural CFGs in our work, which we construct us-
ing the angr library(Shoshitaishvili et al. 2016).
After constructing the CFG we lift all basic blocks to
VEX Intermediate Representation (IR). The fact that each
block is executed linearly allows us to unfold the instructions
within each block and represent them as a directed, com-
putational tree, similar to an Abstract Syntax Tree (AST).
Every node of the resulting tree corresponds to a con-
stant, a register, a temporary or an operation. The edges of
the tree are directed from the argument to the instruction.
Within each block we reuse nodes that correspond to ad-
dresses, temporaries, constants and registers to tie together
potentially related computations (thus preserving informa-
tion about local data-flow within the scope of each basic
block). The VEX IR provides a Static Single Assignment
form (SSA). This means an assembly instruction is lifted to
IR instructions operating on temporary variables which are
each used only once. However, VEX does not track instances
of different definitions/uses of the same register across in-
structions on the basic block level, which we implemented
to ensure we do not introduce fake data-dependence edges.
In our implementation, if an instruction overrides (redefines)
the content of register eax, our analysis renames it to eax 1
and so on. Thus, we do not reuse the same node for eax and
eax 1.
Within each block computations do not necessarily all de-
pend on each other. We may have chunks of code that can
be reordered inside the block without affecting the final re-
sult. In this case our described approach produces a forest of
computations. To connect these trees we add virtual Source
and Sink nodes at the beginning and at the end of each block
as a parent, or correspondingly a child, for all the trees gen-
erated from that block. Table 1 demonstrates how the same
code looks in C, assembly and VEX IR. Figure 1 shows how
IR is translated to a graph. We additionally remove redun-
dant edges and nodes, particularly, Iex Const node that
follows every constant, and chains of Iex WrtTmp→ ‘t%’
→ Iex RdTmp, a more concise resulting graph is shown
in Figure 2. After constructing graphs for every block of
CFG, we connect virtual Sink and Source nodes following
the topology the blocks had in the CFG.
Before feeding the constructed graph into the neural net-
work, we remove SSA indices for temporary variables and
registers to reduce sparsity. The remaining names of instruc-
tions, registers, constants and generic ’t’ for temporaries are
encoded in a one-hot manner and used as a features matrix.
Graph Convolutional Networks
The model we used for learning representations is
a multi-layer Graph Convolutional Neural Network
(GCN) (Kipf and Welling 2017), which has achieved state-
of-the-art performance on a number of benchmark graph
datasets. GCN consists of a few stacked graph convolutional
layers. Intuitively, k-th graph convolutional layer filters
and propagates information from k-th neighborhood of the
node. GCN uses the adjacency matrix of the graph A and
its feature matrix X to generate representations of each
Figure 1: The program graph for the IR code demonstrated in Table 1
Source code Decompiled assembly
/ / i n i t a and b
. . .
c = a − b ;
. . .
; mov edx , dword p t r [ rbp−8]
; mov eax , dword p t r [ rbp−0xC]
sub edx , eax
Lifted to VEX IR
1 : t 4 = GET: I64 ( rdx )
2 : t 3 = 64 to32 ( t 4 )
3 : t 6 = GET: I64 ( r a x )
4 : t 5 = 64 to32 ( t 6 )
5 : t 0 = Sub32 ( t3 , t 5 )
6 : PUT( cc op ) = 0x7
7 : t 7 = 32Uto64 ( t 3 )
8 : PUT( cc dep1 ) = t 7
9 : t 8 = 32Uto64 ( t 5 )
1 0 : PUT( cc dep2 ) = t 8
11 : t 9 = 32Uto64 ( t 0 )
1 2 : PUT( rdx ) = t 9
Table 1: The table demonstrates a line of source code that
performs subtraction, how it is decompiled into assembly
(after compilation), and how it is lifted to VEX IR.
Figure 2: The program graph for the IR code demonstrated
in Table 1 after contracting some of the redundant edges and
nodes
node in the graph, Z . Additional details and intuitions as to
why convolving on a graph in this manner creates a good
representation of its nodes are presented in the original
GCN paper. Here we briefly review the propagation rule
and the final form of the model.
The propagation through (l + 1)-st layer looks like:
H(l+1) = ReLU(D
1
2 A˜D
1
2H lW l) (1)
where A˜ is the adjacency matrix with added self-loops, D
is its diagonal out-degree matrix, ReLU(x) = max(0, x) is
the non-linearity or activation function,H(l) is the result of
propagation through previous layer, H(0) being X , and W l
is a layer-specific trainable weight matrix.
Propagating information through graph convolutional lay-
ers outputs a representation for each individual node. To get
the representation of the entire graph, we aggregated the rep-
resentations of every node in the graph via summation. We
present a schematic illustration of this process in Figure 3.
The resulting aggregated representation is passed through
another fully-connected layer, followed by a softmax which
is defined like softmax(xi) =
exp(xi)∑
i
exp(xi)
, for the final pre-
diction. We use the cross-entropy error as the objective func-
tion for the optimization. Our GCN had three graph convo-
lutional layers and produced representations of size 64.
Baseline
We wanted to compare our proposed representation with an-
other task-independent model. Since NLP methods are pop-
ular and frequently used for a wide range of security tasks,
we chose a bag-of-words representation to be used with a
Support Vector Machine(SVM) classifier. In particular, we
used the SVM with a Gaussian kernel.
For bag-of-words representation we chose to use VEX
IR from angr. We considered each line of IR to be a sin-
gle “word”. Using IR offers a more consistent comparison
with our proposed representation. Additionally, we found
empirically that using lines of IR as features works better
than both using lines of assembly code, and tokenized as-
sembly. Vocabulary for the bag-of-words was obtained from
the training data. We used frequency thresholding to remove
infrequent entries and reduce data sparsity. Those frequen-
cies were empirically tuned on validation data.
Datasets and Experimental Setup
Our first dataset, introduced by (Mou et al. 2016), consists
of 104 online judge competition problems and 500 C or C++
solutions for each problem submitted by students. We only
kept the files that could be successfully compiled on a De-
bian operating system, using gcc8.3, without any optimiza-
tion flags. This left us with 49191 binary executable files,
each belonging to one of 104 potential classes. Each class in
this dataset corresponds to a different problem prompt and
our goal is to classify the solutions into their corresponding
problems.
The second dataset we used is the Juliet C/C++ test
suite(Boland and Black 2012). This is a synthetically gen-
erated dataset, created to facilitate research of vulnerabil-
ity scanners and enable benchmarking. The files in the
dataset are grouped by their vulnerability type – CWE-ID.
Each file consists of a minimal example to recreate the
vulnerability and/or its fixed version. Juliet test suite has
OMITGOOD andOMITBADmacros, surrounding vul-
nerable and non-vulnerable functions correspondingly. We
compiled the dataset twice - once with each macro, to gen-
erate binary executable files that contain vulnerabilities and
those that do not. The dataset contains 90 different CWE-
IDs. However, some of them consist of Windows-only ex-
amples, that we omitted. Note that even though our approach
is not platform-specific, in this workwe limit our experimen-
tation to Linux only.
Most CWE-IDs had too few examples to train a classi-
fier on and/or to report any meaningful statistics on. We also
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Figure 3: Schematic depiction of obtaining a program representation with a single-layer GCN model
omitted any CWE-IDs that had less than 100 files in their
test set after splitting the data with 70:15:15 ratio for train-
ing, validation and test, because for those cases any reported
result would be too noisy.
As a result, we experimented on vulnerabilities from 30
CWE-IDs. We trained a separate classifier for every indi-
vidual CWE-ID, which was required because files in each
CWE-ID directory may or may not contain other vulnera-
bility types. We trained the neural network model with early
stopping, where the number of training epochs was found on
the validation set.
Task 1. Experimental Setup
For experiments in the algorithm classification task, we
randomly split all the binaries in the first dataset into
train:test:validation sets with ratios 70:15:15. We use the
train set for training and extracting some additional helper
structures, such as vocabulary for the bag of words mod-
els and counting frequencies for thresholding in neural net-
work models. We use the validation set for model selection
and finding the best threshold values. After finding the best
model, we evaluate its performance on the test set. The ex-
periments are cross-validated and averaged over 5 runs.
For SVMs, in the model selection phase, we perform a
grid-search over the penalty parameter C and pick a value
for the vocabulary threshold to remove any entry that does
not have a substantial presence in the train set to be useful for
learning. After the trimming our vocabulary contains about
10-11K entries (the exact number changes from one random
run to another).
For neural network representation,we follow similar logic
and use the train set to find and remove infrequent node la-
bels. Here too the exact threshold is decided via experimen-
tation on the validation set. On average, we keep about 7-
8K different node labels. Very infrequent terms are replaced
with a placeholder UNK , or CONST if it is a hexadeci-
mal.
Task 2. Experimental Setup
In the vulnerability discovery experiments, we train a sep-
arate classifier for each of 30 different CWE-IDs. For
Model Accuracy
SVM on VEX IR 0.93
TBCNN 0.94
inst2vec 0.9483
Ours 0.97
Table 2: Accuracy obtained for the task of online judge prob-
lem classification. We show results reported for TBCNN and
inst2vec, though original splits for their experiments are not
available.
every CWE-ID, we split its corresponding binaries into
train:validation:test with ratios 70:15:15, and report results
averaged over 5 random runs. We use training sets for train-
ing the models and validation sets for grid search of the
penalty parameter C in SVMs. We report the performance
of the best model on test sets.
Here we reuse some statistics obtained on the first dataset,
in particular, we reuse frequency thresholds and bag-of-
words vocabularies. We do this because some CWE-IDs
have much larger number of binary executables than others.
To account for this we would need to search for frequency
thresholds in a very large range. Since we need to train a sep-
arate classifier for each CWE-ID, so 30 SVM classifiers and
30 NN classifiers in total, that would lead to a huge search
space at the phase of the model selection. Additionally, de-
pending on how many examples we have in the training set,
the expressive power of the model would vary a lot.
Evaluation and Results
For evaluating performance in our experiments we used ac-
curacy following previous work that we proceed to compare
our results to.
Task 1
Table 2 contains quantitative evaluation of our rep-
resentation for the Tasks 1. Our proposed represen-
tation outperforms our own SVM baseline, TBCNN
model(Mou et al. 2016), and current state-of-the-art for this
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Figure 4: Experimental results for vulnerability discovery on the Juliet test suite.
task - inst2vec(Ben-Nun, Jakobovits, and Hoefler 2018). We
manage to reduce the error by more than 40%, thus set-
ting a new state-of-the-art result. It should be additionally
mentioned that both TBCNN and inst2vec start from the C
source code of the programs to make predictions, whereas
our baseline SVM and our proposed model are only using
compiled executable versions.
Highlighting a few important differences between our ap-
proach and inst2vec helps better understanding some of the
contributions of our approach. To construct the contextual
flow graphs, the authors of inst2vec compile the source code
to LLVM IR, which contains richer semantic information
than VEX IR that we use in this work. Because it is more
high-level, LLVM IR is a difficult target for lifting from bi-
nary executable files.1.
Another key difference is that instead of learning the rep-
resentations of individual tokens and then combining the
tokens into a program using a sequential model, we learn
the representations of all the tokens in the program jointly,
thus learning the representation of the entire program. The
inst2vec, on the other side, ignores the structural properties
of the program at that step. Our results show that we can
achieve better performance, despite inst2vec starting from a
semantically richer LLVM IR. We believe this indicates the
importance of using the structural information at all stages
of learning for obtaining good program embeddings.
Task 2
Figure 4 contains evaluation of our representation for the
Tasks 2. For the second task the classifier based on our
proposed representation outperforms our SVM baseline in
all cases except 2 – CWE-ID590 and CWE-ID761. In both
cases we are seeing less than 5% difference in accuracy. On
the other hand, our proposed representation has quite signif-
icant gain in the performance. In the extreme case of CWE-
1Is covered on Angr’s FAQ page:
https://docs.angr.io/introductory-errata/faq
617 it outperforms the baseline by about 25%, in many other
cases the gain is from 10% to 20% of prediction accuracy.
Additionally, we can indirectly compare our re-
sults for the second task with those presented in
two surveys that use Juliet Test Suite as a bench-
mark for evaluating commercial static analysis
vulnerability discovery tools (Velicheti et al. 2014;
Goseva-Popstojanova and Perhinschi 2015). It must be
noted, that the commercial tools in those experiments
probably did not use most of programs for each CWE-ID
as a training set. Additionally, the tools considered in those
surveys are making their predictions based on source code
and not binaries. Nevertheless, the comparison of the re-
ported accuracies in those surveys with ours tells us that our
proposed representation performs better for vulnerability
discovery than static analysis commercial tools. For exam-
ple, on CWE-IDs from 121 to 126, (Velicheti et al. 2014)
report less than 60% accuracy, whereas our model scores
higher than 80% for each of those CWE-IDs. For tools
studied in (Goseva-Popstojanova and Perhinschi 2015), our
model consistently outperforms three out of four static
analysis tools, and for the last one it outperforms it by
a considerable margin in all cases but two. Those two
are CWE-ID122 where the commercial tool scores a few
percents higher, and, again, CWE-ID590.
These results suggest that our representation has good
prospects to be used in vulnerability discovery tools. For al-
most every vulnerability type our prediction accuracy per-
formance is better than 80% and for many it is higher than
90%.
Discussion
Software in production is usually complex and large, capa-
ble of performing many different functions in different use
cases. On the contrary, programs in our evaluation datasets
are single-purpose, solving a single task with a relatively
small number of steps. Additionally, the entirety of the pro-
gram in Juliet test suite is relevant for vulnerability discov-
ery task, unlike real software where most of the code is not
vulnerable and only a small part of it may have an issue. This
can potentially be solved by introducing representations that
can be computed on different levels of coarseness. This is a
non-trivial task, but our findings hint that once completed
we may be able to achieve far better results for different
problems on production software than is currently possible.
Additionally, we need to get a better understanding of what
properties are captured with such a representation and how
is best to use those or how to add other desirable proper-
ties. Another challenge left for future work is extending this
approach to cross-architecture and cross-compiler binaries.
Conclusion
In this paper we proposed a method for learning distributed
representations for binary executable programs. Our learned
representation has a potential to be used for a wide variety
of binary analysis tasks. We demonstrate this by putting our
learned representations to use for classification in two se-
mantically different tasks - algorithm classification and vul-
nerability discovery. We show that for both tasks our pro-
posed representation achieves better qualitative and quanti-
tative performance, compared to other state of the art meth-
ods, including common machine learning baselines.
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